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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how to optimize intelligence sharing in a coalition by a 
thorough literature review and site visits to intelligence sharing organizations in 
order to establish best practices for multinational intelligence sharing.  The newly 
established NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) in Mons, Belgium was treated as 
a test case to validate their intelligence sharing procedures and structures in 
reference to the authors’ identified best practices: mutual gains and benefits; 
trust; direct control; and accessibility and interoperability.  
Intelligence support to SOF is a decisive factor, when in conventional 
operations it often is not; therefore intelligence support to SOF is special - NATO 
SOF is no exception.  The level of intelligence support to SOF normally only 
exists at the national level, due to bureaucratic obstacles, a need to protect 
sensitive sources and capabilities, and lack of trust.  The NSHQ is experimenting 
with several innovative methods to enhance trust and streamline intelligence 
capability amongst NATO SOF forces. There are structural and organizational 
lessons learned from the establishment of the NSHQ that can be applied to 
future operations and coalitions. 
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The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will 
remain America’s relations with our allies, and our commitment to 
their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly 
cultivated, not just because they are indispensible for U.S. interests 
and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental 
to our collective security. Alliances are force multipliers: through 
multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions 
is always greater than if we act alone… we will continue to mutually 
benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances. 
President Barack Obama1 
The changing security environment requires the Joint Force to 
deepen security relationships with our allies.2 
National Military Strategy of the United States 
A. OVERVIEW 
NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all 
its members via political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic 
Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter.3 “There is a common 
perspective among a variety of defense and security establishments around the 
world that the nature of the current and future security environment we face 
presents complex and irregular challenges that are not readily apparent and are 
difficult to anticipate.”4  SOF is being singled out and recognized as a key  
 
                                            
1  President Barack Obama, “The National Security Strategy,” Washington, 2010, 41, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed  
November 4, 2011). 
2  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America,” Washington, February 8, 2011, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-
02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf (accessed February 24, 2011). 
3  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” November 19, 2010, 
18, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html (accessed February 24, 2011). 
4  North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC), “The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study,” December 4, 2008, ii.  
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSHQ/GetFile/?File_ID=29 (accessed February 24, 2011). 
 2
component of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance in the fight 
against contemporary and future threats, because SOF is “ideally suited to [the] 
ambiguous and dynamic irregular environment” facing NATO.5   
SOF has traditionally been considered a national asset. NATO had no 
history of utilizing SOF in the Alliance when NATO nations first assumed 
responsibility for the conflicts in the Balkans.  However the lessons learned 
during those conflicts were not applied due to a lack of a central NATO SOF 
entity until the NATO Riga summit of 2006.  On December 22, 2006, Admiral 
William McRaven was appointed Director of the NATO SOF Coordination Center 
(NSCC) and ordered to start the transformation process. Three years later, on 
March 1, 2010, the NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) was formally established 
as a three-star headquarters within the Alliance in Mons, Belgium.6  
According to its mission statement, the purpose of NSHQ is twofold.  First, 
it must optimize the employment of SOF by the Alliance. NSHQ further describes 
this as “the intention to make the employment of SOF as perfect, efficient, and 
effective as possible, so as to deliver to the Alliance a highly agile Special 
Operations capability across the range of military operations.”7  Second, it must 
provide a command capability when so directed by Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR). NSHQ further describes this as “the ability to deploy a robust 
C4I capability and enablers for the support and employment of SOF in NATO 
operations.”8  To be able to carry out successful special operations in support of 
the current and future operating environments, the Alliance needs adequate 
interoperability, command and control, and intelligence structures.    
Even amongst the closest allies, challenges in intelligence sharing remain.  
During the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, British operators were denied 
access to intelligence fused by the U.S. that the British had gathered themselves.  
                                            
5  NSCC, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study,” ii.  
6  NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “Biennial Review,” January 2010, 6. 
7  Ibid., 1. 
8  Ibid., 1. 
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The issue became so contentious that it had to be raised by British and 
Australian Prime Ministers with the U.S. President to be resolved.9  Having 
realized that intelligence sharing is always a compromise between the need to 
share and the need to protect (even with the best-designed organizations, much 
less a large, multinational, bureaucratic organization), the NSHQ has developed 
an innovative approach to solving its intelligence deficiencies.  It has created its 
own organic intelligence collection, analysis, and exploitation capability. It has 
also acquired its own equipment and created a robust NATO SOF training facility 
and training program to supplement intelligence flow to NATO SOF forces.!
B. BACKGROUND 
Special operations often test the limits of both equipment and personnel. 
This extremity introduces a significant degree of uncertainty or “fog of war.” 
Success in special operations dictates that the uncertainty associated with the 
enemy, weather, and terrain must be minimized through access to best available 
intelligence.10  Most special operations conducted nationally benefit from access 
to the best national intelligence available. However, because of classification 
issues, special operations by international coalitions often lack access to the best 
available intelligence.  This absence increases the likelihood of operational 
failure and further risks the personal safety of the operators.  
NATO (and many of the individual member states) foresees a future threat 
environment shaped by unconventional threats such as transnational crime, 
terrorist attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.11  There 
are so many similarities in threats projected by the NATO member states and by 
official NATO strategy it is easy to conclude that a common enemy exists: 
transnational problems require transnational solutions. The complexities in the 
international order and the “significant challenges to the intelligence system [that] 
                                            
9  Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 318–319. 
10 William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and 
Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996).  
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” 18. 
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arise in targeting groups such as al-Qaeda due to their networked and volatile 
structure”12 make multinational intelligence sharing requisite. There is much to 
gain from multinational cooperation.  The expected continued decline in military 
budgets and limited SOF human resources make burden-sharing and proper 
division of labor even more appropriate.   
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Intelligence is a decisive factor, sometimes the decisive factor, in special 
operations.  As such, the NSHQ’s ultimate success will rely on its ability to solve 
some of the perennial problems related to intelligence sharing within coalitions.  
The newly established NSHQ in Mons, Belgium serves as an excellent testing 
ground to analyze SOF intelligence sharing issues within a coalition. NSHQ is 
attempting to streamline and optimize the intelligence available to NATO SOF 
units.   
The scope of this research will be limited to NATO SOF nations, with 
particular emphasis on why the NSHQ has created its particular organizational 
structures, procedures, manning requirements, and training programs to improve 
the intelligence picture available to the SOF operator.  We will focus on the 
headquarters element, not the tactical or operational levels in current operations 
in Afghanistan.   
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
As depicted in Figure 1, NATO SOF has a detailed doctrine for inputs into 
the intelligence process for operational units arriving from a variety of sources 
both NATO and national. 
                                            
12 Lawrence E. Cline, “Special Operations and the Intelligence System,” International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 4 (2005): 579. 
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Figure 1.   Current NATO SOF Intelligence Support Architecture for 
Operations13 
NSHQ realizes that there are limits to the intelligence that can or will be 
shared in a large coalition environment.  Because there are limitations to the 
doctrinal approach, the NSHQ is developing procedures, acquiring equipment, 
and creating a NATO SOF intelligence curriculum. This work facilitates an 
intelligence-sharing framework that does not rely exclusively on national or 
NATO structures to supplement intelligence support to NATO SOF operations. 
In this thesis, the authors will examine whether the NSHQ is optimized for 
intelligence sharing in a coalition environment.  The goal of this thesis is to 
determine the most effective way for NATO SOF to enhance operational 
performance and increase operator safety through intelligence sharing. 
                                            
13 NATO SOF Coordination Center, Special Operations Task Group Manual v1.0, December 
2009, 6-2. 
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E. CONCEPTUAL AND RELEVANT LITERATURE 
There is little unclassified literature measuring the effectiveness of 
international intelligence sharing on military operations, and almost no literature 
on international intelligence sharing in SOF operations.  There is no body of 
scholarly literature available on intelligence sharing in NATO. For this thesis, the 
authors will draw on organizational design literature and examine several types 
of multinational and intelligence organizations and U.S. interagency operations to 
draw parallels and lessons learned in order to recommend best practices. 
F. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
We will identify best practices by conducting a literature review and field 
studies of intelligence sharing and by conducting a gap analysis with observed 
NSHQ procedures to determine whether the NSHQ is operating optimally, and if 
not, we will make recommendations for improvement.  
The theoretical framework for this research seeks to understand the 
critical role that intelligence plays in special operations, how intelligence sharing 
facilitates successful coalition special operations, and the best structures and 
conditions for intelligence sharing.  To do this, we will look at some historical 
examples.  The “Five Eyes” agreement among the U.S., UK, Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand dating from the early Cold War is the first significant historical 
multinational intelligence-sharing agreement.14 In the post-Cold War era, NATO 
countries have been operating in a multinational framework for conflicts, such as 
those in Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.  The literature review, field 
studies, and discussions with subject matter experts will be the foundation for our 
analysis.  This foundation describes problems and solutions for intelligence 
sharing.  Figure 2 demonstrates our framework and methodology.   
                                            
14 The National Security Agency, “Declassified UKUSA Signals Intelligence Agreement 
Documents Available,” The National Security Agency, 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2010/ukusa.shtml (accessed November 4, 2011). 
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II. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS: 
WHY SOF IS DIFFERENT 
 
The nature of many SOF objectives and tactics requires intelligence 
support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in 
conventional operations.15 
Joint Publication 3-05 
SOF need intensive and comprehensive study of their targets. U.S. 
SOF prepared for Grenada with maps roughly on a par for 
inadequacy with those used by the British in Gallipoli. The contrast 
between the excellent intelligence available to French forces in 
Algeria and the almost always inadequate, or just nonexistent, 
intelligence available in Indochina illustrates the point. Special 
operations cannot succeed without good intelligence; in common 
with tactical surprise it is close to constituting an absolutely 
necessary condition for operational success.16  
Colin Gray 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1942, Allied intelligence learned that Germany had stepped 
up production of heavy water in a heavily guarded facility in occupied Norway.  
Heavy water is used in the production of nuclear material.  Afraid that Germany 
was developing an atomic weapon, the British drew up plans to destroy the plant 
after conventional bombing operations failed.  Nine Norwegian commandos 
trained by the British Special Operations Executive, under cover of night, 
surreptitiously entered the facility, went to the exact location of the heavy water 
cylinders and destroyed the stockpile.  Because they had precise intelligence, the 
commandos knew exactly where to go; they had trained on full-scale mock-ups 
of the facility.  Their intelligence was so accurate that they even knew the 
                                            
15 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, 1998, V-2. 
16 Colin Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations 
Succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/99spring/gray.htm (accessed March 14, 
2011). 
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location of the keys needed to lock up the night watchman.17  Upon conclusion of 
the mission, the team reported back to their headquarters in London: “Operation 
carried out with complete success.  High-concentration plant completely 
destroyed.  No suspicions aroused and no shots exchanged.  Greetings.”18 
As with many special operations, intelligence was the decisive factor in 
this operation.  Without access to the critical intelligence about the facility, even 
the best-trained and equipped operators would have faced a significantly higher 
probability of failure.  This chapter describes why special operations forces have 
special intelligence requirements for success.   
B. BACKGROUND 
It is commonly stated that intelligence support to SOF operations is critical 
for mission success, yet the literature never discusses in detail why this is so. 
Most accept that intelligence is critical for SOF is self evident.19   Is intelligence 
for special operations different from intelligence for conventional units?  In other 
words, is intelligence for special operations “special?”  If intelligence for SOF 
(and NATO SOF by extension) is “special,” then it is imperative that the NSHQ 
develop the proper tactics, training, and procedures (TTPs) and acquire the 
correct intelligence equipment and systems to create the most appropriate 
possible intelligence support.  Intelligence support to special operations is 
“special” in that intelligence is often a decisive factor in the planning and 
execution of a special operation, where in conventional operations it is not.   
Special operations are high-risk ventures with the expectation of a high 
payoff in return. Often a nation’s prestige is also at stake. The operations are 
frequently conducted on the margins of what is possible, and therefore, the 
                                            
17 Russell Miller, Behind the Lines: the Oral History of Special Operations in World War II 
(New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 107–15. 
18 Ibid., 115. 
19 Even the Army Field Manual for intelligence support to Army SOF spends only two short 
paragraphs discussing why intelligence is critical for SOF operations.  See Army Field Manual 3-
05.102, Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence, 2001, v. 
 11
operational environment is often uncertain.  In these situations, “successful 
special operations are dramatically influenced by the commander’s ability to 
make the right decision, at the right time.”20  To reduce uncertainty and to 
facilitate decision making, intelligence plays a key role.  If a commander can get 
access to timely, relevant, accurate, and detailed intelligence, it will simplify 
decision-making and increase the possibility of mission success.  Lawrence E. 
Cline describes SOF as “voracious consumers of intelligence.”21  SOF normally 
needs access to best available intelligence during planning and operations.22 
There are two broad categories of special operations: direct special 
operations and indirect special operations. This chapter will examine intelligence 
support to both types, but will focus on the direct type, sometimes called 
commando operations.  While the types of intelligence support to SOF required 
for both operations are different, SOF has unique intelligence requirements for 
each in the granularity of detail and focus, which are distinct from conventional 
intelligence requirements.  
Intelligence support to special operations is different from intelligence 
support to conventional operations. According to the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Forces Intelligence Manual (FM 3-05.102), there are three main 
differences, as follows: 
First, the complex missions, the intricate planning, and the decentralized 
execution of SOF missions require a greater level of intelligence detail than does 
a conventional operation. Due to their small footprint, for SOF the “mission 
hinges upon having a key bit of knowledge at a specific time or event.”23  The 
relatively small size and autonomy of SOF forces requires intelligence inputs to 
the planning, training, and execution portions of an operation.   
                                            
20 Army Field Manual 3-05.102, 2-1. 
21 Cline, “Special Operations and the Intelligence System,” 576. 
22 See McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare. 
23 Army Field Manual 3-05.102, 2–5. 
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Second, given the high risk of strategic consequences of failure and the 
uncertainty of the operational environment, timeliness and accuracy of the 
information for special operations are more crucial than for a conventional 
operation. SOF commanders need extremely detailed intelligence to help make 
the go/no go decision.   
Third, the sensitivity of and need for very detailed information requires 
direct interface between the personnel conducting a mission and the intelligence 
personnel.  Due to the reliance on relative superiority (see below for an 
elaboration of this term) in most SOF operations, intelligence collection and 
analysis must support efforts to maintain surprise, military deception (MILDEC), 
and operational security (OPSEC).24  
C. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY AND THE THEORY OF SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS 
For commando operations, “relative superiority” is a critical concept.  
According to Admiral William McRaven, “relative superiority is a condition that 
exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage 
over a larger or well-defended enemy.”25  McRaven argues that relative 
superiority is brought about by several factors, which allow a mission to 
overcome, for a limited period of time, the “frictions of war” at the pivotal or 
decisive moment in an engagement.  SOF forces with cutting edge technology, 
national level intelligence, and high-quality training can minimize the frictions of 
war and achieve relative superiority. McRaven defines the frictions of war as 
chance, uncertainty, and will of the enemy.  According to McRaven, six principles 
of special operations allow SOF to achieve relative superiority:  simplicity, 
security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.  The principles work because 
they reduce warfare to its simplest level and limit chance, uncertainly, and the 
 
                                            
24 Army Field Manual 3-05.102, 2-4–2-5. 
25 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 4. 
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enemy’s will.  Achieving relative superiority is possible for small but not for large 
forces, as large forces are unlikely to be able keep all of the principles in 
balance.26  
To achieve relative superiority, SOF must take into account the principles 
during the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation or training, and 
execution.  Good intelligence is important during all phases of an operation and 
affects all of the principles.  Without good intelligence, it is impossible to develop 
a plan that maximizes the probability of achieving relative superiority.  Without a 
good plan, the likelihood of achieving relative superiority during the execution 
phases is lessened.   
The inherent weakness of SOF is their lack of firepower relative to a 
larger, conventional force.27  A larger force, by definition, does not require 
relative superiority to succeed since by its sheer numbers it cannot be 
overwhelmed by a smaller force.  Therefore, a smaller force must look for other 
factors that will allow it to succeed.  The smaller the attacking force, the greater 
the level of intelligence required for inputs into the planning process.  A smaller 
force cannot rely on just firepower to overcome an opponent.  This is where SOF 
must look for competitive advantage, such as through technology and surprise, 
over the numerically larger and better-defended force.  All things being equal, 
both a large force and a small force would like to have perfect intelligence, but 
without high quality intelligence, the chances of failure rise more rapidly for the 
smaller force.  A larger attacking force generally requires less detailed 
intelligence, because they are not relying on the principle of relative superiority to 
overcome a size deficit; a larger force is relying on numerical superiority.  Even if 
a SOF force is relying on technology or specialized training to overwhelm a larger 
force, intelligence is critical for the design of the technology or training program.  
Figure 3 depicts this phenomenon.  Operations on the left-hand side require 
intelligence with a higher degree of detail for success.  As an operation moves 
                                            
26 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 5–8.   
27 Ibid., 6. 
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further to the right and becomes larger, it needs less detail and lower intelligence 
fidelity to succeed because it will not rely on relative superiority to overcome a 
size deficit.  Therefore, if a force is small and relying on relative superiority, it had 





Figure 3.   Intelligence Granularity 
D. THE DIRECT APPROACH 
The Italian manned torpedo attack in Alexandria Harbor, Egypt in 1941 is 
an example of why intelligence is critical to the successful conduct of special 
operations.  Six Italian frogmen were able to destroy two of the most important 
ships in the British fleet, a feat the Italian and German navies and air forces were 
unable to accomplish.  The Italians were aware from previous failed manned 
torpedo strikes at Gibraltar and Malta that they needed to have detailed 
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intelligence for the mission to succeed.  During this previous operation in Malta, 
they did not have an agent on the ground to provide supporting intelligence.  On 
the other hand, agents in Alexandria reported on harbor patrols and other harbor 
defenses.   With the detailed intelligence on the harbor, the Italians were able to 
tailor their mission rehearsals to the mission profile required for the harbor.  
Commenting on the realistic training, one of the frogmen recalled that the mission 
seemed like “an exercise.”28  The operators were able to examine aerial photos, 
maps, and human intelligence (HUMINT) reports from Alexandria. The detailed 
intelligence picture helped to determine a route to bring the host submarine, le 
Scire, to within 1.3 miles of the harbor entrance and to plot a safe and direct 
route for the manned torpedoes.29 
The intelligence picture was also critical in determining a go/no go 
decision point for the mission.  Due to poor weather and lack of location data on 
the targets for the mission, the Italians postponed the operation for twenty-four 
hours.  They received a final operational intelligence update the day of the 
operation, allowing for precise targeting.  The final intelligence update allowed 
intelligence to play a role in the execution phase, in addition to the planning and 
training phases of the mission.  
Detailed intelligence made the 1940 assault on Eben Emael in Belgium 
possible for a small German force.  The Germans knew they could not neutralize 
the fort with a conventional parachute, air bombardment, infantry, or armored 
assault before artillery from the fort was able to destroy the bridges the Germans 
needed.  Having available only a small force outnumbered ten to one, the 
Germans had to plan carefully.  They had excellent intelligence, which reduced 
the planning considerations.  A German subcontractor who helped build the fort 
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provided blueprints of the structure, allowing the planners to know the exact 
location of the large guns and fields of fire.30  Additionally, they had detailed 
photo intelligence from flyovers.   
All of the detailed intelligence allowed for tabletop models of the facility to 
be constructed.  The Germans knew where to expect counterattacks, which 
casemates and cupolas to attack, and had specially designed shaped charges to 
destroy the casemates.  All of this fed into the training cycle.  The Germans 
conducted their demolition training against similar casemates and the gliders 
landed in an area comparable to the layout of the fort. The physical training was 
also based on intelligence.31  In this case, the intelligence provided critical inputs 
to the planning and training phases vice the execution phase.  The detailed 
intelligence helps explain how sixty-nine German commandos could seize the 
most expensive and hardened fort of its day. 
The 1943 operation against the Vermork Heavy Water facility in Norway 
demonstrates the interplay between intelligence and targeting.  The British 
deemed the facility strategically important and devoted considerable resources to 
attempting to destroy it, but failed.  The Norwegian commando team that later 
assaulted the facility had intimate knowledge of it.  Without previously seeing the 
facility, the operators knew where the buildings were in relation to each other and 
knew the best locations for concealment and cover.32  The operators carried the 
exact weapons load to conduct their mission.  Without the precise intelligence, a 
small team would not likely have been able to enter the facility as quickly and 
without firing any shots.  The intelligence played a critical role in the planning and 
training portion of the mission. 
The role that intelligence played in the 1970 Son Tay prisoner of war 
rescue operation is critical, but unfortunately the intelligence was also flawed.  In 
                                            
30 McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 43. 
31 Ibid., 61. 
32 Miller, Behind the Lines, 110. 
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some tactical aspects of the operation, the intelligence was nothing less than 
superb.  In other aspects, the intelligence failed the team.  The operators had 
access to the best technical intelligence, allowing them to develop a plan to 
ingress deep into North Vietnam without being detected.33  They also had access 
to a scale mock-ups of the facility built for use in planning and had a detailed 
assessment of the conditions of the Prisoners of War (POWs).34 
If the planners had decided to take the risky step of using a HUMINT 
source to verify the presence of the POWs, they might have learned that the 
facility was empty.  The failure to correctly determine that there were no 
prisoners at the camp was both a product of wishful thinking and the desire to 
avoid signaling to the North Vietnamese their intention to conduct a raid.35  The 
intelligence at the unit level was superb and allowed for the mission planners to 
develop a highly innovative plan that was nearly flawless in its execution.   
E. THE INDIRECT APPROACH 
Intelligence required for Special Operations using the indirect approach is 
also very distinct from both the direct approach and from conventional unit 
intelligence needs.  Joint Doctrine states “intelligence support to SOF in [Military 
Operations Other Than War] MOOTW requires an expanded focus of the 
standard scope of intelligence functions.”36  The intelligence must discuss 
political, economic, cultural, and family and tribal relationships, in addition to 
traditional military data.  Unconventional warfare (UW), psychological operations 
(PSYOPS), and foreign internal defense (FID) are mission types that center on 
understanding the population, key tribes, and personalities in a region.  The more 
                                            
33 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. 
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36 Joint Publication 3-05, V-2-3. 
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information available on the particular groups and their grievances, culture, 
vulnerabilities, and religion, the more effective the indirect force will be.  Tools 
such as network analysis are designed to provide insight into the wider group or 
tribal structure. 
The intelligence requirements for the indirect approach contrast with 
intelligence requirements for SOF direct-action missions and conventional forces 
that are tasked to attrite enemy forces.  For example, conventional forces, when 
attempting to destroy an enemy tank, don’t need to understand the religious 
background or the language of the tank commander.  They need only to 
understand what type of round will penetrate the tank’s armor.  
The Bay of Pigs invasion, while not a classic indirect case, provides a 
clear example of what happens when intelligence about the attitudes of local 
populations is misunderstood or not taken into account.  The key assumption of 
the invasion force was that an invasion and initial success would cause a chain 
reaction of uprisings throughout the country due to the unpopularity of the Castro 
government.  The invaders also assumed that low morale among Castro’s forces 
would prevent them from putting up a good defense.  Both assumptions turned 
out to be very wrong.  Significant amounts of HUMINT were available that 
demonstrated the level of motivation and effectiveness of Castro’s forces and 
should have provided a more realistic assessment of the level of resistance.37 
The Village Stability Operations (VSO) program in Afghanistan conducted 
by SOF demonstrates the need for a very different type of intelligence capability.  
Understanding the tribal and ethnic dynamics in an area is critical for success in 
stability operations.  Each new VSO site is chosen after a detailed review of the 
project’s goals in a specific area.  For example, in some areas SOF may choose 
to set up a VSO near a minority tribe’s village to provide protection.  In other 
areas, SOF may set up the VSO in the district center to support a local governor 
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who has been deemed competent.38  Only by closely monitoring the intelligence 
picture by using both unclassified open-source and classified intelligence 
collection can a detailed and current understanding of the human environment be 
gained and maintained. 
F. CONCLUSION 
While the requirements for both the direct and indirect methods vary from 
the intelligence requirements for conventional forces, they also vary from each 
other.  The intelligence for the direct approach is very detailed, specific, and 
usually highly classified.  The intelligence for the indirect approach is more 
general and usually unclassified or lowly classified.   
It is not surprising that in a war such as Afghanistan in which special 
operations have played such a prominent role, intelligence has also played a 
critical part.  It is a change from previous conflicts; previously, intelligence was 
important, but not the decisive factor.  Former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Director Michael Hayden observed: 
[T]he Soviet Union's most deadly forces -- ICBMs, tank armies -- 
they were actually relatively easy to find, but they were very hard to 
kill. Intelligence was important, don't get me wrong, but intelligence 
was overshadowed by the need for raw, sheer fire power.  Today 
the situation is reversed. We're now in an age in which our primary 
adversary is easy to kill, he's just very hard to find. So you can 
understand why so much emphasis in the last five years has been 
placed on intelligence.39 
Intelligence is now a decisive factor in the current conflicts.  With the 
emphasis on counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, some of the facets of 
special operations intelligence have made it into the larger military intelligence 
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scheme.  Former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) CJ2 Major 
General Michael Flynn argued in 2010 that: 
[B]ecause the United States has focused the overwhelming majority 
of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, 
our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer 
fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate 
and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.40 
He essentially argued for military intelligence in Afghanistan to resemble 
the intelligence required for indirect operations.  This trend will likely continue, as 
the current conflicts lend themselves to a special operations model. 
Almost every publication states that intelligence is critical for special 
operations success.  No publication discusses the reasons in detail.  For direct 
operations, intelligence must help determine what is necessary to gain relative 
superiority due to SOF’s smaller size and limited firepower.  Once that is 
determined, intelligence must be considered in the planning, rehearsal, and 
execution phase of an operation. For indirect operations, intelligence must 
describe the political, cultural, and economic environment of the battle space.  
Special operations rely on aspects of intelligence that conventional forces, due to 
their size advantage and mission, can afford to overlook.  In this respect, 
intelligence support to SOF is a decisive factor, when in conventional operations 
it usually is not; therefore intelligence support to SOF is special. 
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III. INTELLIGENCE SHARING CHALLENGES AND WAYS TO 
MASTER THEM 
Although the literature on international intelligence cooperation is 
sparse and largely historical there is hardly any doubt that all 
intelligence services perform some kind of liaison function. None 
has all the resources—financial, human, and technical—to be 
entirely self-sufficient in all areas. Furthermore, the transnational 
nature of security threats makes isolation an impossible option.41 
Stéphane Lefebvre 
A. BACKGROUND 
SOF is a valuable tool in contemporary conflicts around the world. We 
have already established that SOF has special needs in intelligence to be 
effectively employed with minimal operational risk. Stéphane Lefebvre argues 
that no nation will have all the resources to be self-sufficient in all intelligence 
areas, yet intelligence sharing and cooperation has proven to be difficult even 
within a long-standing alliance like NATO. This chapter will first describe some of 
the challenges for multinational intelligence sharing and then suggest possible 
mitigations to these challenges, understanding that intelligence sharing, 
especially in an international context, will be problematic. 
B. CHALLENGES AND SHARING OBSTACLES 
1. Lack of Mutual Interest and Cost/Benefit 
The cost/benefit analysis is the crucial starting point for countries to join an 
intelligence sharing collaboration, either on the battlefield or in crisis prevention.  
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interests. Lefebvre describes these mutual interests as “a common enemy and 
great gains of sharing.”42 If these are lacking, the cost versus benefit analysis will 
normally keep states from sharing intelligence.  
The maxim “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has guided countries to 
share intelligence throughout history. Many authors belong to the “common 
interest school” to explain why intelligence sharing on the international level 
sometimes works and sometimes does not work.43  James I. Walsh, in his recent 
book The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, argues that states will 
share intelligence with each other when they have a common interest and when 
there are possible gains in sharing.44 In cases where mutual interests are strong 
and the value of sharing is high, the flow of information and intelligence is 
normally not a problem.45 
2. Bureaucracies 
One school of thought on why intelligence sharing does not happen as 
readily as it should in an international context is that while it may be official state 
policy to share intelligence, intelligence bureaucracies in individual countries 
actively resist direction to share intelligence.  Authors who argue in favor of this 
reach a conclusion similar to ”mutual interests” authors as Walsh and LeFebvre, 
but for different reasons. 
Björn Fägersten is one of the scholars arguing for bureaucratic resistance 
as one of the key challenges of intelligence sharing.  Building on Graham 
Allison’s studies of bureaucratic roles in policymaking, Fägersten doubts policy 
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makers’ ability to direct outcomes in intelligence sharing.   Fägersten uses the 
example of Europol to demonstrate that while European policy makers 
repeatedly stated that they wanted intelligence shared among Europol members, 
intelligence and security services refused to provide valuable intelligence.   
The two main roadblocks are bureaucratic interests and bureaucratic 
culture.  Bureaucratic interests are essentially turf-wars in which actors in 
organizations resist sharing due to the desire to control the intelligence they 
generated and in which they lack incentive to give up sole authority. The old 
adage “information is power” is appropriate here. Intelligence organizations are 
reluctant to give up their secrets because it is not in their self-interest to do so. 
According to Fägersten, “self-interest is inherent in any political actor . . . 
bureaucratic actors pursue their own rational goals such as increased budgets, 
more power in the decision-making process or personal advancement.”46 Each 
organization wants to be the one organization whispering secrets in their 
president’s or prime minister’s ear.  
Equally persuasive is the bureaucratic culture argument. Fägersten states 
that intelligence and security organizations are essentially conservative and 
resistant to change.  Intelligence staffs have little contact with and rarely 
cooperate with outside agencies. As such, they are naturally suspicious of 
outside organizations, especially foreign organizations. Intelligence organizations 
are generally established to collect and keep secrets from foreigners and thus 
they are wary that sharing exposes the organization to the risk of a leak. The 
examples that Fägersten gives are persuasive.  He lists repeated attempts by the 
European Union after 9/11, the Madrid bombings, and again after the London 
bombings to force multilateral intelligence sharing with Europol.  Each instance 
proved futile.47 
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A third explanation as to why international intelligence sharing is 
problematic is the bureaucratic process itself.  U.S. Army COL George Gramer 
gives an example of the bureaucratic process preventing intelligence sharing at 
the operational and tactical level. He describes the confusion created by various 
rules and contradictions in doctrine that made intelligence sharing for NATO 
difficult during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR in Bosnia.  While joint doctrine 
states that intelligence dissemination is an operational commander’s 
responsibility; it gives little guidance on how to accomplish this task.48  The 
confusion resulted in loss of timely intelligence, redundant reporting, and resulted 
in nations relying on their own exclusive national intelligence systems. 
“Intelligence collected by exclusively national sources often seemed to be 
siphoned off into national channels; in most cases, the intelligence was never 
shared with the coalition,” according to Gramer.49 
Another example of this is outlined in Norwegian media. It states that 
Norwegian security laws, created during the Cold War to protect Norwegian 
intelligence, prevent Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan from sharing intelligence 
with their partners, ultimately putting soldiers’ lives at risk.50 
The 9/11 Commission Report did not directly address international 
intelligence sharing, but shed light on why domestic intelligence sharing within 
the U.S. intelligence community was problematic, as well as the lack of incentive 
each organization had to share intelligence.  Each agency had its own internal 
rules against sharing, and lacked rewards for sharing.  There were no 
punishments for not sharing information and no penalties for over-classifying 
information.  In other words, there was no incentive to share for individual 
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analysts, only risks in doing so.51 In a multinational environment this is even more 
problematic because release of classified information requires approval from a 
Foreign Disclosure Officer or an equivalent bureaucrat. 
Intelligence agencies are generally embedded in bureaucratic national 
organizations. These bureaucracies are conservative, resistant to change, and 
reluctant to share intelligence; furthermore, their staffs have little contact with, 
and few systems to cooperate with, outside agencies. The “need to know” 
principle and stove-piping of information persist. The consequence of this 
behavior is over-classification and excessive compartmentalization.  
3. Sharing Enablers 
A lack of will or lack of capabilities, or a combination thereof in large part 
explains the failure to overcome a lack of ”Mutual interest” and bureaucratic 
obstacles to intelligence sharing.52 In the following section the potential factors to 
enable intelligence sharing and to overcome the systemic resistance to change 
will be analyzed in four categories: gains, trust, direct control, and accessibility. 
Although the literature on collaboration in general is broad and extensive,53 these 
categories are the authors’ attempt to analyze this literature based on our 
observations54 of why intelligence sharing occurs when it does.   
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4. Gains 
Gains or mutual benefits are necessary conditions for intelligence 
sharing.55 The members of an intelligence coalition weigh the benefits and costs 
for contributing before entering into an intelligence sharing relationship. 
On an organizational level, a country’s investment in a multinational 
coalition has to be attractive and cost efficient. No one country’s intelligence 
service has all the resources (financial, human, technical) to be entirely self-
sufficient in all areas.56 A state may share collection capabilities with a foreign 
intelligence service and share the results of the collection, or a country may grant 
the use of its territory to collect intelligence in exchange for sharing in the 
information collected.57 The guiding principle, “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” illustrates one of the purest forms of mutual benefit and common interest. 
Mutual benefits are essential to maintain desirability for the different members of 
an intelligence sharing coalition.  As with many types of cooperation, the benefits 
of intelligence sharing increase with the frequency with which the participants 
exchange intelligence and the range of issues their agreements include.58  
The Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATF-South) is one example of 
intelligence-sharing success. According to Dr. Christopher J. Lamb of the 
National Defense University, one of the most commonly cited reasons for JIATF-
South’s success is that partner organizations and nations believe they get a great 
return on their investment. In exchange for intelligence they get credit for drug 
seizures or prosecutions, making partnering with JIATF-South a productive 
investment.59  
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A solid goal-setting process that culminates in a clear mission can drive 
the intelligence sharing process.60 JIATF-South is a purpose-built counternarcotic 
organization, and its narrow mission helps to keep the focus on agreed upon 
intelligence issues.61 Another example of a purpose-built intelligence sharing 
organization is the Pentagon Intelligence Fusion Center (PIFC). PIFC´s target 
customers and main contributors are countries filling important positions in 
Afghanistan.62 This linkage to operations substantiates PIFC´s clear 
understanding of the goals to be achieved and fosters a belief among its 
members that the organization is worthwhile.63 
5. Trust 
Trust is based on expectations about how others are likely to behave in 
the future.64 Cooperation generally depends on trust. The level of trust is one 
factor that influences how much intelligence is shared.65  
One of the most influential factors in the judgment of trust is 
competence.66JIATF-South has a dozen personnel in senior positions who have 
worked in the field against illicit trafficking for over 20 years, and almost half of 
the entire command has been on board for six years or more.67 At JIATF-South, 
new personnel are mentored by experienced members, but also pass through 
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training programs to establish a common baseline level of competence.68 
Competence is a necessary condition for trust in an intelligence-sharing 
environment, however it is not sufficient without the existence of a common 
culture.  
A common culture is characterized by shared values, goals, norms, 
policies and similarities. Collaborative professional training and education 
programs, as well as shared experiences in general, stimulate a common culture. 
The deeper the common culture, the better the community’s tacit understanding 
and the more predictable the actions of other coalition members. The derived 
common culture is a form of social institution that facilitates internal 
coordination.69 Increased combined duty builds a deeper sense of trust and 
community. Trust-building depends inevitably on time.  
James Walsh, author of The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 
describes the competence/common culture nexus by analyzing the UK-U.S. 
agreement of 1948 in comparison to the Gehlen organization, the predecessor of 
the Federal German Intelligence Service. The Gehlen organization provided 
expert knowledge on the Soviet Union, but the knowledge was less trusted by the 
U.S. due to the organization’s Nazi background. The British, on the other hand, 
provided expert knowledge on their colonies and former colonies, and the 
information and intelligence was more trusted by the U.S. because of the UK-
U.S. common culture.70 
Relationships in the SOF community are based primarily on face-to-face 
contact, which is more information-rich than purely virtual communication and 
therefore more likely to inspire trust. As relationships develop, increasing 
knowledge of another person and information about cultural similarities lead to  
identification with this person, that is, to seeing oneself and another person as 
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belonging in the same group. Increased trust is a product of this identification and 
it encourages trust with the group as a whole. 71 
Both the exchange of information and the openness with which the 
information is exchanged provide evidence about the assessment of another’s 
trustworthiness.72  The level of trust needed in an intelligence-sharing 
environment is achieved when all actors assume that intelligence products are 
routed to the right consumer by default and regardless of the nationality of the 
recipient.   
6. Direct Control  
In any intelligence-sharing agreement there is always a fear that 
participants will violate the agreements, will not be as responsive as required, or 
will withhold intelligence and not disseminate it properly.  One attractive option to 
counter these fears and manage the risks is to rely on a clear hierarchy with one 
leading agency or nation in direct control of the intelligence collaboration 
framework. Hierarchical agreements include a dominant state, responsible for 
making the most important decisions and for monitoring compliance. 73 The 
leading agency’s responsibility is to maintain focus and direct efforts.74 The 
leading agency or nation can properly be held accountable only if it has the 
authority to punish those who violate the agreement. 
The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, names the lack of a central 
authority as a fundamental problem of efficiency and intelligence sharing.75  A 
hierarchy can deliver the cooperative synergy and intelligence fusion that 
member states in an alliance desire. The CIA-Gehlen collaboration during the 
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Cold war is a successful example of a hierarchical intelligence relationship, 
where the CIA was the dominant actor with direct control over the Gehlen 
organization.76         
Conversely, participating countries are aware that if they pay lip service to 
the requirement to share intelligence and instead focus only on their own 
interests, they will be punished.  The PIFC, for example, has clear job 
requirements for contributing countries. The U.S., as PIFC´s framework nation, 
reserves the right to vet each country’s incoming personnel to make sure they 
are qualified and not a security risk.77 
7. Accessibility 
Effective intelligence sharing requires accessible and compatible means of 
secure communications. In a multinational intelligence-sharing environment, the 
members of the different nations have to be able to connect with each other in 
order to exchange classified intelligence.  
One basic requirement at the individual level is simply to speak the same 
language. PIFC and the JIATF-South demand adequate language proficiency in 
English on combined duty positions. Beyond that, JIATF-South (with its clear 
regional focus) regularly distributes a compendium of “best operational practices” 
translated into several languages.78  
The information age created further opportunities to ensure 
communications and the exchange of intelligence.  The PIFC is using the NATO 
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) as a central 
information system to facilitate communication. JIATF-South is connected to 
nations by the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System, which has 
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online chat rooms with real-time translation.79  Existing compartmentalized 
practices can be minimized through a liaison infrastructure. The PIFC´s foreign 
disclosure officer is physically located between the coalition partners using solely 
BICES and the U.S. personnel using national systems, in addition to BICES to 
ensure accessibility of intelligence for coalition members.80 
A solution to avoid classification and policy obstacles is the bottom-up 
approach.81 Instead of starting an intelligence process from the “top” with the 
highest classification, the starting point should be from unclassified and open 
source and then steadily move up the “classification” ladder. Commercial off-the-
shelf technology, which continues to become more and more capable, has the 
potential to foster accessibility of information since the raw data is unclassified 
and the analysis can be written for release to foreign partners. 
8. Sharing Enablers Nexus 
While the enablers we have just discussed are not enough to completely 
overcome the desire not to share intelligence, they do help overcome the 
obstacles to sharing and help mitigate the risks associated with sharing.  None of 
the enabling categories described above should be considered in isolation. A 
majority of the mentioned factors are inevitably interconnected to each other. 
Policies and standards implemented by a lead nation also can have a positive 
effect on trust building. Violations of security standards can destroy credibility of 
one actor or nation, but can increase trust in the system if appropriately handled.  
 
                                            
79 Lamb and Munsing, Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least 
Understood Interagency, 49. 
80 Visit to the Pentagon Intel Fusion Center (PIFC). 
81 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 193. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous reasons why intelligence sharing is challenging, and 
nations have significant reasons not to share intelligence even with their closest 
allies.  Bureaucratic interests and states’ fears of compromise prevent effective 
intelligence sharing and there will likely never be complete intelligence sharing 
among nations.  There are specific factors that can mitigate the fears associated 
with sharing intelligence, however.  The factors that facilitate intelligence sharing 
are mutual gains, trust, direct control by a leading agency or nation, and 
accessibility.  The combination of these factors supports the “trust, but verify” 
approach in intelligence sharing relationships.82 
 
 
                                            
82 Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence Sharing in the War on Terror,” 468. 
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IV. CRACKING THE CODE: THE NSHQ AND INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING 
Although the possession of intelligence is a battle-winning factor, 
the full impact of intelligence cannot be effectively applied unless 
both the intelligence itself and the information from which it is 
derived can be shared. Interoperability, in this case the ability to 
exchange information and intelligence, is the key to successful 
multinational operations. 
NATO Intelligence Doctrine83 
NATO developed most of its intelligence doctrine during the Cold War.84 
Operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, demonstrated to the NSHQ 
leadership the theoretical predictions that intelligence sharing is problematic even 
under the best of circumstances and would not work well in a SOF 
environment.85 NSHQ subsequently developed an innovative approach to solve 
the problem of intelligence sharing among NATO SOF forces. This approach 
clearly exemplifies the four pillars we identify in Chapter Three: mutual 
gains/benefits; trust; direct control; and accessibility and interoperability.  By 
using this approach, the NSHQ addressed most of the factors that make sharing 
intelligence difficult. In those cases for which sharing is not possible, NSHQ has 
developed methods to supplement their intelligence collection and analysis.   
A. MUTUAL GAINS/BENEFITS: RELEVANCE OF NATO SOF AND 
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE ALLIANCE 
In its new strategic concept, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic 
Engagement, NATO characterizes the threat of conventional aggression against 
the Alliance or its members as low. The future threat is more likely to be 
unconventional and most likely to come from a ballistic missile attack, a terrorist 
                                            
83 NATO AJP-2 “Allied Joint Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security Doctrine P 2,” 
2003, 1-1-1. 
84 Ibid.  
85 NSHQ Chief of Staff briefing, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 20, 
2011. 
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attack, or a cyber attack.86  The future threats articulated in the new strategic 
concept document echo the threats described by several NATO countries in their 
national strategies, including the U.S.  The newly released U.S. National Military 
Strategy emphasizes both the ongoing shifts and increasing interconnectedness 
in the international order and the threat from non-governmental actors such as 
terrorists and pirates. Looking at the similarities in future threats among member 
states and official NATO strategy, it is easy to conclude that a common enemy 
exists, establishing the critical requirement for the mutual gains that can come 
from intelligence sharing. The complexities in the international order and the 
“significant challenges to the intelligence system [that] arise in targeting groups 
such as al-Qaeda due to their networked and volatile structure” make 
multinational intelligence sharing a prerequisite.87 In other words, there is much 
for all to gain from multinational intelligence cooperation.   
SOF has been identified as a key tool in the post 9/11 security 
environment for solving these contemporary conflicts that the NATO members 
have in common. Many NATO SOF units have conducted multiple deployments 
to and operations in Afghanistan over the last ten years. The result is that NATO 
SOF units are more experienced and combat tested than ever. Yet a 2008 NATO 
study found that “[A]lliance SOF operational experiences… in Afghanistan have 
demonstrated gaps in policy, organization, interoperability, and resourcing that 
have caused these highly valuable forces to operate inefficiently and at times at 
cross purposes.”88 NATO formally established NSHQ to further transform and 
integrate NATO SOF; currently, NSHQ provides the operational command 
capability to the ISAF SOF HQ and its intelligence arm, the Special Operations 
Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in Kabul, Afghanistan to mitigate the intelligence 
sharing problems.   
                                            
86 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept.” 
87 Cline, “Special Operations and the Intelligence System,” 579. 
88 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC),“The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study.” 
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The individual NATO SOF nations will benefit by increasing their 
intelligence capacity, which gives them an incentive to participate in the NSHQ 
effort to increase intelligence capacity across the NATO SOF force. NATO SOF 
cannot afford to rely on national intelligence alone as the primary source of their 
intelligence as this is too time-consuming, problematic, and unreliable in a 
tactical SOF environment.  The collection and analytical effort by the different 
nations task forces is fused by the SOFFC.  Without this oversight,  collection 
and analysis efforts would be narrowly scoped and might miss the broad picture 
needed to be effective against a widespread enemy network.  This thesis has 
argued that there is a need for effective multinational intelligence sharing to make 
NATO SOF relevant to the Alliance in present and future conflicts. Without 
intelligence sharing, NATO SOF will not be as effective as possible, thus each 
state should have an incentive to share relevant intelligence within NATO SOF. 
B. TRUST, COMMON CULTURE, AND COMPETENCY:  INTELLIGENCE 
STANDARDIZATION, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION  
As NATO SOF moves from a “stovepiped,” nation-dependent model to a 
“plug-and-play” model, NATO SOF members benefit from being part of a larger 
NATO SOF intelligence apparatus as equipment, training, and analytical 
capability is standardized, trust is built, and intelligence is shared.89 To enhance 
trust, competency, and intelligence sharing amongst its members, the NSHQ 
relies on a robust program of intelligence standardization, training, and 
education.  At the core of the NSHQ’s intelligence mission are the NATO SOF 
Training and Education Program (NSTEP) and training facility at Chievres Air 
Base near the NSHQ in Mons, Belgium. 
When the NSTEP was developed, the basic assumption was that the 
intelligence education curriculum was a natural starting point.  Most nations’ SOF 
were able to conduct the Finish piece in the Find, Fix, and Finish, Exploit, and 
Analyze (F3EA) cycle described in figure 4.  However, very few of the NATO 
                                            
89 In the plug-and-play model, the NATO SOF task forces all have similar intelligence 
requirements and standards; NSHQ COS briefing, October 20, 2010.   
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SOF nations had the assets, countrywide reach, or the capability to find, fix, 
exploit and analyze alone.  The NSHQ expends most of its intelligence training 
time in these phases.90  
 
Figure 4.   F3EA Cycle 91 
Most NATO nations do not have an intelligence sub-specialty or an 
intelligence Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).92  Additionally, intelligence 
personnel with experience in SOF are an even smaller subset of intelligence 
personnel, so the number of trained SOF intelligence personnel across NATO is 
small. For this reason, SOF intelligence education was a natural starting point for 
the NSHQ.  A NATO school with intelligence courses exists, but was not focused 
on SOF requirements.  The NSHQ identified new requirements based on the 
gaps between what was already taught in NATO courses and the training 
requirements for SOF personnel as described in figure 3. 
                                            
90 NSTEP Director, discussion with authors, Chievres Air Base, Belgium, October 26, 2011. 
91 F3EA cycle, NSCC SOTG Manual v 1.0, December 11 2009, 4-17. 
92 Observation from NSHQ site visit, October 25, 2011. 
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Figure 5.   NATO SOF Intelligence Training Requirements93 
The NSHQ (through NSTEP) offers a wide range of intelligence courses 
aimed at standardizing NATO SOF intelligence skills for both operators and 
analysts. .  The courses are geared toward SOF at the operational and tactical 
levels, with a focus on current operations in Afghanistan.  Some of the 
intelligence courses offered by the NSHQ are: 
• Basic Intelligence Course 
• Threat Network Analysis Course  
• ISR Seminar 
• Warrior View Course 
• Cell Phone Exploitation Course 
• Forensic Exploitation Course 
• Precision Geo-Location Familiarization Course 
                                            
93 NSHQ Intelligence Training briefing, NSHQ, Mons, Belgium, October 27, 2011. 
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• Maritime Intelligence Course 
• Technical Exploitation Operations Course94 
With trained and qualified SOF intelligence personnel, NATO SOF will be 
better prepared to integrate intelligence into the planning and conduct of 
operations, in addition to being more educated consumers of intelligence.  
Shared training also creates a baseline standard amongst the NATO SOF, which 
increases trust and competency.   
A second key piece of the NSTEP is building personal relationships.  The 
NSTEP program spends 75 percent of the time on coursework, but the other 25 
percent of the time is spent developing relationships and learning how to operate 
in a multinational SOF environment.95  With relationships thus established, 
NATO SOF forces arrive in the field with an established, trusted network, since 
people know each other and have a basic understanding of differing military 
cultures.   
To further the trust amongst the various nations, the NSHQ does not have 
mobile training teams.  The rationale for this decision is to prevent individual 
nations from suspecting that they have received less thorough training than have 
other nations and to force members to attend the training at the NSTEP where 
they meet members from other nations.  The practical effect is that all the nations 
involved receive the same intelligence baseline, thus strengthening competency.  
In addition, all nations know that they all have received the same training as well 
as enhanced personal relationships among the members of the NATO SOF 
community.  The participating non-NATO SOF nations (Partnership for Peace 
members, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, etc.) that are part of the coalition 
also receive the same training.  There are no exclusions, cutouts, or other 
                                            
94 NATO SOF Training and Education Program, “NSTEP Course Offerings,” 
http://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/ (accessed November 1, 2011). 
95 NSTEP Director, discussion with authors. 
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segregation for participating members.  All cleared and vetted participants are 
treated equally with regards to clearances and access to NSHQ systems. 96  
Over the last few years, NATO SOF personnel have established trusted 
networks through continuous training exercises (e.g., COLD RESPONSE, 
FLINTLOCK), training programs (e.g., NSTEP) and operational commitments 
(e.g., Balkans, Afghanistan).  Because the NATO SOF community is fairly small 
in comparison to any one country’s military apparatus as a whole, the personnel 
tend to encounter the same people on multiple occasions and thus develop close 
personal ties, which promotes rapid trust building.97 
C. DIRECT CONTROL: THE U.S. AS THE FRAMEWORK NATION 
In March 2006, Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) 
suggested establishing an SOF Component Command “on par with the Joint 
Force Commands.”98 The proposal was turned down.  However, at the Riga 
Summit later that same year, the NATO heads of State approved a U.S. initiative 
to start the process of transforming NATO SOF with the purpose of optimizing 
SOF within the Alliance. On December 22, 2006, Admiral McRaven was 
appointed Director of NSCC and ordered to start the transformation process. 
Three years later, on March 1, 2010, NSHQ was formally established as a three-
star headquarters within the Alliance, with the U.S. as the framework nation.99   
The U.S. as the framework nation has been pivotal in the stand-up phase 
of the NSHQ. It is unlikely that any country other than the U.S. would have had 
the capabilities to foster the transformation from a three-man special operations 
office headed by a Colonel to a functional headquarters, headed by a three-star 
                                            
96 NSTEP Director, discussion with authors. 
97 Authors’ observation. 
98 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, “Biennial Review,” 
99 The other members of the May 2006 joint initiative were Norway, Holland, and Poland.  
See NATO correspondence, May 15, 2006, provided by NSHQ.  Within NATO, a framework 
nation is the lead nation supporting a NATO unit.  It is responsible for providing the command 
leadership, key resources, and infrastructure.  Refer to 
http://www.aco.nato.int/page208301014.aspx for more information. 
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general officer, of over 150 staff members in a time period of just four years.100 
The U.S. is currently manning 40 percent of NSHQ´s positions and more than 30 
percent of the positions in the Special Operations Intelligence Branch (SOIB) and 
the SOFFC.101  The main financial burden for NATO SOF falls on the U.S., with 
USSOCOM alone contributing $300 million of its fiscal year 2010 budget to 
NSHQ.102 A crucial responsibility is to dedicate strong leadership to the 
command level. The U.S. is manning the most important positions such as the 
commander, chief of staff, and the directors of the SOIB and SOFFC. Finally, 
NSHQ doctrines are largely modeled on U.S. doctrine.103 
The SOIB and the SOFFC are the primary mechanisms within NATO SOF 
charged to ensure that intelligence is shared with NSHQ and the operational 
elements.  The SOIB is “designed to provide timely and relevant multi-source and 
multinational SOF specific intelligence to the full spectrum of NATO SOF 
missions to meet Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) 
requirements.”104  The SOIB, located in Molesworth, England, has three 
analytical teams that serve in Afghanistan on a rotating basis to maintain 
currency in the threat environment.  The SOFFC, located in Kabul, is “focused on 
garnering information from a multitude of sources, fusing that information with 
operational requirements to produce, and then disseminate, actionable 
intelligence to NATO Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) in 
Afghanistan.”105 
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The U.S. decisively influences the most important decisions of the NSHQ. 
In terms of its capabilities and responsibilities, the U.S. is powerful and credible 
enough to hold other countries accountable if they do not fulfill required and 
agreed-upon benchmarks. For example, nations will not receive BICES terminals 
until they have fulfilled NSHQ requirements and participated in necessary 
training.  
D. ACCESSIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY:  USING TECHNOLOGY 
TO FILL GAPS AND FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
A key pillar of NSHQ’s intelligence sharing strategy is to use technology to 
facilitate sharing and fill the gaps where national intelligence is not shared in a 
timely manner.  When the NSHQ’s precursor agency, the NATO SOF 
Coordination Center (NSCC), was established, the commander (Admiral 
McRaven) did not even have a way to securely communicate with the NATO 
SOF units and was forced to rely on unclassified email and unsecured phones.  
Most NATO SOF units did not have NATO systems in their headquarters or at 
the tactical level.106  This single deficiency highlighted the challenges NATO SOF 
had in trying to create secure mechanisms from scratch to share intelligence. 
The first challenge for the NSCC began with a search for a Command, 
Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) network. NSCC 
decided to leverage the NATO BICES network as their baseline network.107  The 
system is scalable and rapidly deployable to NATO SOF units, both in national 
headquarters and in the field.     
The second challenge for NATO SOF was bureaucratic: intelligence was 
often held in national channels due to classification and bureaucratic resistance 
and was not being disseminated down to multinational units in the field in a timely 
                                            
106 NSHQ COS briefing, October 20, 2010, and Alan Dron, “Special Network—Alliance Aims 
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manner—or in some cases at all.  Analyses from completed NATO SOF 
operations in Afghanistan were not forwarded back to the relevant task forces or 
to the NATO SOF units in the field. The NSHQ’s approach to this problem is 
unique and needs to be explored in detail.   
The NSHQ realized that the resistance from individual nations’ intelligence 
services to releasing intelligence in a timely manner would be significant, so they 
decided to supplement intelligence that came from national intelligence services 
and NATO structures for tactical intelligence support.   They acquired 
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) technical exploitation equipment to collect and 
analyze the data on their own such as biometric, cell phone exploitation, and 
forensic systems.108 
The main advantage of using COTS equipment is that NATO SOF units 
can classify the data at a level that is releasable to NATO or ISAF instead of to 
national levels.  Since the data is releasable to NATO, it still is accessible by 
national systems, but NATO SOF units can analyze the data themselves.  Having 
the data rapidly and readily available to the NATO SOF task forces facilitates a 
rapid turnaround in the intelligence cycle.  With an intelligence baseline standard 
established by the NSTEP, NATO SOF relies less on NATO intelligence or 
national intelligence structures for intelligence support.  Armed with these 
intelligence skills, NATO SOF can generate intelligence at a classification level 
appropriate to the force.  There is no waiting for a Foreign Disclosure Officer 
(FDO) to release or downgrade the intelligence in a timely manner; they have 
access to the raw intelligence from the start.   
An example of the use of COTS technology is the tactical biometric 
systems fielded by NSHQ. The NSHQ owns the systems, trains the operators on 
their use, and hand-receipts the kits to the NATO SOF units when they arrive in 
Afghanistan.  Before the kits are issued, the NSHQ verifies that the recipients 
have been appropriately trained on the kits’ use. NSHQ maintains the kits, and 
                                            
108 For example, see NATO SOF Technical Exploitation Operations Course.  
https://www.nshq.nato.int/NSTEP/page/login/?ItemTempID=12 (accessed November 10,  2011). 
 43
when the units leave Afghanistan, the kits are returned to NSHQ for servicing 
and maintenance.  The raw biometric data collected is stored on a secure, but 
unclassified server.  NATO SOF intelligence analysts with the task forces or at 
the SOFFC and who have a valid reason to access the data will be granted 
access to the raw data.  The analysts in the field will then be able to turn the data 
around into the intelligence cycle with a classification appropriate to NATO SOF.   
The NSHQ is following this pattern with SIGINT collection, cell phone 
exploitation, forensic analysis equipment, and a BICES intelligence toolkit.109  
Use of these procedures furthers interoperability by standardizing the equipment, 
data collection, and data storage across the NATO SOF.  Even if a task force is 
replaced by a task force from another NATO SOF nation, there is consistency in 
NATO SOF operations regardless of the task force’s origin. 
The NSHQ has the leeway and has been granted the authority to produce 
its own best practices manuals and to update their Tactics, Training, and 
Procedures (TTPs).  Unlike NATO doctrine, which takes several years for 
approvals, the NSHQ can update the manuals as changes become necessary.110  
The ability to rapidly update manuals streamlines interoperability and 
synchronization, so all units arriving in theater use the latest procedures. 
E. CONCLUSION  
The NSHQ has “cracked the code” for intelligence sharing. It has avoided 
many of the potential pitfalls inherent in intelligence sharing arrangements (those 
pitfalls identified in Chapter 3) and developed a method for increasing the 
amount of intelligence available to the task forces.  The NSHQ developed its 
intelligence organization and structures with the understanding that it will never 
have complete access to all available intelligence, but its structures, practices, 
and procedures mitigate intelligence sharing problems. By standardizing training, 
improving competency across NATO SOF, using unclassified or NATO classified 
                                            
109 NSTEP Director, discussion with authors. 
110 Ibid. 
 44
information, and acquiring their own C4I systems, the NSHQ has bypassed 
obstacles that complicate intelligence sharing.  With SOIB and SOFFC, the 
NSHQ retains proximity to the end user.  Feedback in the form of lessons 
learned from end users in Afghanistan influences intelligence-sharing policies 
and are applied to the NSTEP training and the technological infrastructure.  In 
continuing to do so, the NSHQ is able to put pressure on the national intelligence 
organizations to review their own policies of sharing to avoid becoming irrelevant 
to NATO SOF. 
The operational impact of intelligence sharing within NATO SOF can be 
demonstrated by former ISAF commander General David Petraeus’ words on 
August 2010 to the NATO Secretary General: 
Over the past three months, SOF elements carried out more than 
4,000 total operations that captured or killed 235 insurgent leaders 
and more than 2,500 lower-level fighters – likely an unprecedented 
number in the history of SOF. . . . The increase in SOF successes 
also results from improved ISR capabilities, our improved abilities 
to fuse intelligence, increased partnering efforts with Afghan 




                                            
111 NATO Special Operations Headquarters. "Special Operations Intelligence Branch," 
November 2010, 4. 
 45
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, A WAY AHEAD 
A. SUMMARY 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis argue that SOF is a valuable tool in 
contemporary conflicts and that SOF relies on accurate and current intelligence 
to ensure that training, planning, and execution of SOF operations precisely 
address the situation in an intended target area. SOF normally employs multiple 
intelligence disciplines, and mission success relies on access to coherently fused 
all-source products delivered to the SOF operator. Intelligence support to SOF is 
different from intelligence support to conventional units because more and 
different detail is required and because it has to be disseminated all the way 
down to the operator for planning and mission execution.  
Chapter Three of this thesis argues that intelligence with the granularity 
demanded by SOF historically has existed mainly at the national level. Because 
of bureaucratic obstacles, the need to hide capabilities and sources so as to 
avoid their compromise or loss, and lack of trust this kind of intelligence has 
historically not been shared with alliance or coalition partners. Realizing that 
intelligence sharing will never be perfect, Chapter Three of this thesis argues that 
however problematic, there are specific factors that can mitigate the fears 
associated with sharing intelligence.  The factors that facilitate intelligence 
sharing are mutual gains; trust and competence; direct control by a leading 
agency or nation; and accessibility and technology.  A balanced combination of 
these factors supports the “trust, but verify” approach in intelligence sharing 
relationships.112 
This thesis set out to examine whether NATO SOF is optimized for 
intelligence sharing in a coalition environment. In Chapter Four, this thesis 
explores both the current status of the NSHQ intelligence structure, and practices 
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and procedures in NATO SOF, and concludes that NATO SOF addresses all of 
the factors that mitigate the potential pitfalls in intelligence sharing arrangements. 
B. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NSHQ has “cracked the code” for intelligence sharing. They have 
established an organization that mitigates the problems related to intelligence 
sharing. However, the NSHQ faces the challenge of maintaining consistency for 
optimized intelligence sharing conditions. The thesis has recognized that NATO 
SOF is a successful intelligence sharing organization; it might therefore be 
disrupted by the tendency of successful organizations to grow larger.  
One danger related to enlargement is that the NSHQ might become more 
bureaucratic, increasing the likelihood that bureaucratic obstacles will appear. 
Another danger related to expansion is that successful organizations attract 
people--everyone will want to participate and send personnel to learn, but not to 
contribute. This lack of common competence will undermine trust, one of the 
crucial factors for intelligence sharing to occur. It is therefore crucial that the 
NSHQ continue to uphold the standards of personnel working in intelligence 
related positions. 
The U.S. as a framework nation has been crucial in establishing the 
current intelligence sharing relationship within the NSHQ. While having a strong 
framework nation in direct control is important, it is also crucial to be aware of the 
dangers. Unilateral or unbalanced actions by the U.S. could result in partner 
nations questioning the current perceived benefits of the intelligence sharing 
relationship. 
Operations in Afghanistan are a driving factor for the current intelligence-
sharing framework within the NSHQ. Most of the intelligence training, education, 
and SOPs are based on lessons learned from the SOFFC. SOFFC is a purpose-
built intelligence sharing organization with the sole purpose of optimizing the flow 
of timely and accurate intelligence to the different taskforces on the ground. With 
operations being the centerpiece for optimized intelligence sharing, it is 
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imperative for the NSHQ to look “beyond” current operations in Afghanistan and 
toward future operations.   The SOIB is one mechanism through which the NSHQ 
can institutionalize future SOFFCs with the lessons from Afghanistan and prevent 
the NSHQ from having to rebuild a functional intelligence sharing structure for 
future requirements.  It is much easier to adjust the target set than to rebuild the 
entire intelligence sharing mechanism. 
At the core of the NSHQ’s intelligence sharing program is capacity 
building through education at the NSTEP.  The current courses, with one 
exception, are all Afghanistan centric.  The recently added Maritime Intelligence 
Course is a step in the right direction for potential future operational challenges.  
One of the SOF truths states, “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be 
created after emergencies occur.”113  As such, the NSTEP needs to be looking 
forward.  It is important that the courses at the NSTEP reflect the entire spectrum 
of SOF capabilities and missions and go beyond the scope current operations in 
Afghanistan.    
C. NATO SOF: AN EXPORTABLE MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
The intelligence-sharing model that NSHQ developed fits its needs and 
organizational structure.  The NATO structure presents a ready-made 
bureaucracy with delineated command relationships, IT and support 
infrastructure, and manning procedures.  Yet the natural advantages of a long-
standing operational alliance alone were not enough to create the conditions for 
intelligence to be shared amongst the NATO SOF members without significant 
challenges.   
Structural changes, facilitated by the creation of the NSHQ, have helped 
to enhance intelligence sharing among NATO SOF members.  A long-standing 
structure is not a prerequisite for creating a multinational intelligence sharing 
institution.  In this respect, the NSHQ had unique access to a preexisting NATO 
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framework, but lessons can still be applied to other coalition intelligence sharing 
partnerships, whether law enforcement, regional and international, or even 
economic intelligence agreements.   
The most important enabler is for all members of the partnership to feel 
that they gain a mutual benefit from membership.  While some members may 
contribute more intelligence than they gain from the intelligence exchange, they 
may gain other political, diplomatic, or economic benefits from memberships.  All 
members must have a stake in the successful exchange of information.   
Second in importance is that a basic level of trust and competency must 
be established among the members.  The NSHQ realized there was a large gulf 
in intelligence capability amongst the NATO SOF forces, despite a smaller gap 
between the operational capabilities of the units.  By creating a standard 
intelligence skill set via the NSTEP, the units had a smaller gap in intelligence 
capability, which increased the credibility of forces.  As the credibility of the 
forces increases, so does the trust.  Other organizations trying to replicate 
NSHQ’s success should concentrate on capacity building across the force. 
The NSHQ chose a model of direct control to centralize decision making 
for its structure.  Using direct control in a diverse military organization is a natural 
fit, but in other intelligence sharing models, direct control may not be necessary.  
If another model of authority is chosen, it must clearly delineate the roles and 
responsibilities of each member, and it must have a way to punish violators.  If 
the agreement doesn’t have enforcement mechanisms, solving the “free-rider 
problem” will be difficult.114 
The increased capability of COTS intelligence equipment and availability 
of open source information has a big potential to change restrictions against 
sharing.  Historically, intelligence sources and methods were amongst a nation’s 
most guarded secrets.  Now, for a very modest investment, intelligence collection 
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platforms are commonly available.  With information collected at unclassified or 
lowly classified levels, nations have less to fear in exposing national intelligence 
capabilities and should be more forthcoming in sharing intelligence.   
Secure communication systems need to be established in any intelligence 
sharing apparatus.  Secure communications support trust, and without a secure 
communications, there will always be the risks of a leak.  The NSHQ chose a 
system that they could scale rapidly and could push out to the headquarters, 
various operational units, and deploying units.  Each organization will have 
different requirements, but lack of secure communications will hinder sharing and 
significant thought should go into selecting the appropriate C4I network. 
This thesis examined several coalition intelligence sharing organizations.  
One common theme in successful (or partly successful) intelligence sharing 
organizations is that they were purpose-built.  JIATF-South (counter-drugs), the 
NSHQ (tactical SOF operations in Afghanistan), and the PIFC (strategic 
intelligence in Afghanistan) all have a clear mission and mandate. Europol 
(transnational crime) is an example of an organization with a large scope and 
broad mandate; it has struggled to have its members share intelligence in a 
meaningful manner.  Future multilateral intelligence sharing organizations should 
try to keep the scope of the cooperation narrow and focused to help achieve 
success.   
While the conditions under which the NSHQ was created are unique due 
to its status a NATO organization, the lessons learned from its approach to 
intelligence sharing are valuable.  Former British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill once remarked, “It is no use saying ‘We are doing our best!’ You have 
got to succeed in doing what is necessary.”115  In this respect, the NSHQ is doing 
what is necessary and has created a blueprint for other intelligence sharing 
organizations to follow.   
                                            
115 The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/special.php3?file=w980510 
(accessed  December 1, 2011). 
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